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Abstract
Smartphones have become very popular over the past years, thus being owned by
almost every individual, the devices also follow their owners throughout the day
thus having access to a lot of information about their users. Additionally various
companies provide additional services through applications on mobile devices which
makes them highly interested in what people do with their mobile devices, as it
allows perfection of these services.
To collect usage data, on top of having user consent, a company must be able
to actually see what is happening on the device. But in regards to growing concern
about user privacy, operating systems on mobile devices isolate applications limiting
their access to only a small part of information of what is happening on the device.
Options like running surveys exist, but are highly dependent on honesty of the people
and expensive.
To gain the information about running applications network traffic can be utilized
as more and more devices are constantly connected to the internet. On the other
hand, as well as application isolation, the network traffic is also being more and more
protected.
This thesis starts with reviewing previous works to give a picture of what kind of
information can be extracted from mobile device and it’s network traffic and how it
can be used. The main aim of this thesis is to implement a system that detects the
used applications and their running times by combining mobile network traffic with
application launch times and using machine learning. To assess the detection quality
and scalability thoroughly, several tests are performed.
The implemented detection system shows good potential as it achieves near
perfect results in optimal conditions, yet to provide these conditions in every case, a
lot of work has to be done still.
Keywords Feature extraction, Internet, Market analysis, Random Forest,
Smartphones
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7Symbols and abbreviations
Symbols
A Application runs set
C Classes set
F Flows and features set
G Vector of class probabilities
P Set of all flows with their respective features
Pr Flow features related to application run r
P ∗r Filtered flow features related to application run r
α Accuracy function
β Badness metric
δxy Kroneker delta function of x and y
ϵ End Time function
η Skew
γ Classifier
κ Kurtosis
ω(t, g) Occurance count of t truth class index and g predicted class index
ϕ Precision function
ψ Mean absolute deviation
ρ Recall function
σ Variance
θ Number of selections to test
υ Ratio of excluded applications
ξ Start Time function
a Number of all applications
b Predicted application by probability sum
c Class index
e Number of excluded applications
f Flow index
h Predicted application by thresholded probability sum
o Predicted application by probability sum
r Application run index
s Number of selected applications
8Operators
: Logical if
[x1, .. xi] Vector or ordered set of i values
X¯ Mean of values in X
∧ Logical and
⌊x⌋ Biggest integer value that’s smaller than x
argmax(x) Index of maximum value of x
ln(x) Natural logarithm of x
maxcount(x) Count of maximum value’s occurance in x
max(x) Maximum value of x∑n
i Sum over index i running from 0 to n√
x Square root of x
{x1, .. xi} Set of i values
x ∈ X Value x belonging to set or vector X
| Logical for
|X| Count of values in vector or set X
|x| Absolute value of x
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ACK Acknowledgement Number
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSV Comma-separated values
DDCasino DoubleDown Casino
DES Data Encryption Standard
3DES Triple DES
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange version 2
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
MAC address Media Access Control Address
NAT Network Address Translation
OS Operating System
P2P Peer-to-peer
PC Personal Computer
RAM Random Access Memory
RAN Radio Access Network
SDK Software Develompent Kit
SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SSH Secure Shell
SVC Support Vector Classifier
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network
WZ Wizard of Oz Slots Free Casino
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity (Wireless local area network)
XOR Exclusive or operator
1 Introduction
Mobile phones are nowadays following their owner’s every step and store massive
amounts of personal information. A lot of effort is put simultaneously into protection
and exploitation of owner’s privacy, which can be seen in many examples given by
Tourani et al. in [1]. The information from mobile devices is very valuable, as it is very
personal to the device owner and is usually not faked. For example big social events
or spread of sicknesses can be predicted by looking at the movements of people as
shown in [2–6]. Trends and preferences of people can help market prediction and thus
provide better ways for growth for companies. On the downside personal information
can also be used for less ethical actions, like hackers gathering information about
people for blackmailing, phishing or targeted hacking purposes. Additionally countries
can spy on their own people to for example detect anti-government individuals and
monitor their activity more closely or change the content people see while browsing
the internet as shown in [7, 8].
Because of the vast data availability, companies and individuals try to protect
mobile devices from misuse of available information, as users do not always get
notified properly about gathering of this information. This protection is mostly
performed by isolating applications inside the mobile device and setting very strict
policies on what can be accessed by each of the installed applications. With isolation
strength growing day by day, the information gathering from within the mobile
device becomes more difficult. Although there are still many things that can be said
about mobile device users by looking at vast sensor data provided by the device,
there is information that cannot be gathered that way.
Aside from collecting information from inside the mobile devices, there are options
to collect it from mobile operator’s infrastructure or the internet. This way no special
permissions from the device itself are needed, but instead there has to be access to
the path over which the devices communicate with the world. For example it is not
hard for operators to gather information about which mobile network radio base
stations a specific device connected to over time. Already this knowledge can give a
lot of information about a specific person’s life and habits as shown in [9,10]. The
base station logs, however, are usually only accessible by mobile connection operators
who might not be eager to share this kind of data easily.
To get more fine grained information about users without having access to their
mobile devices, one can examine the network traffic associated with the devices.
Because devices are almost constantly connected to the internet, one could potentially
tell what user is doing with his/her mobile phone throughout the day. For example
one could look at the amount of data transferred during different times by the device
and try to infer what kind of things the person likes to do by defining activities, like
watching videos, listening to music or reading news. The level of detail of this data
can be made even higher by having a look at the endpoints of the connections related
to the device, which could potentially give exact service names the user prefers.
Information gathered this way allows targeted advertising or enables companies to
make business decisions based on current trends as discussed by Hautala in [11].
To limit the availability of this fine grained data about users, there are options like
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) for keeping the connection between the mobile device
and a VPN Server encrypted and secured. Additionally many applications encrypt
their traffic to protect user’s privacy. This disallows peeking into the transferred
data itself, but it is still impossible to avoid third parties to see the data transfer
itself.
This thesis aims at extraction of information about mobile device to identify user
habits. Extraction is performed by looking at encrypted data transfers related to a
mobile device. As the encrypted data does not provide much to look at, the amount
of usable information is relatively small. To get the most out of it, a known machine
learning algorithm is applied to analyze the available data and make predictions of
actual events.
1.1 Motivation
Market analysis has played an important role in perfecting and optimizing products
and marketing. For example companies can check how changes in applications reflect
on the market in cases of their own changes as well as their competitor’s changes.
Instead of spending people’s time on surveys, which also give a lot of room for
cheating, a good approach for gathering this data is following the mobile phone usage.
Especially as more and more people are moving from owning personal computers to
having phones and tablets which follow them throughout the day.
However ever more often using of strong encryption for data transferring and
having a secure OS design is emphasized. As a result current mobile operating systems
are constantly strengthening application isolation, thus closing off possibilities for
information gathering even in cases where users consent to the gathering themselves.
A part of information being hidden is application usage on a mobile device with
exact knowledge of which application has been used and how much. Therefore an
approach able to get this information with system’s restrictions in place is needed.
1.2 Author’s role
For the work presented in this thesis the initial state was a working VPN setup together
with test devices with installed application for gathering foreground information.
Additionally several ideas have been proposed by authors coworkers. The author
carried out the development and evaluation of the automated application detection
system in following aspects:
• Configuration of traffic capture on VPN server
• Automation of application launching on test devices
• Feature extraction and alignment for ground truth
• Utilization of machine learning algorithms
• Configuration for bad connection tests
• Manual usage tests
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1.3 Structure of the thesis
The first part of the thesis will consist of descriptions of relevant techniques in Sec. 2
and a literature review in Sec. 3 of works related to retrieving and utilizing information
gathered from mobile devices. Starting off by looking at call and usage information,
which has been available for longer time and then continuing into rapidly growing
network usage’s information gathering.
The second part of the thesis focuses on solving the problem of application
recognition. In Sec. 5 and Sec. 6 the solution to the problem is reasoned and
described thoroughly. Sec. 6 additionally describes the metrics used to understand
how well the approach works and highlight what are the actual problems.
Finally Sec. 7 goes through various detection quality analyses made with the
implemented system and finds explanations to presented results. These explanations
show how the system might be improved in terms of detection performance. Various
improvement ideas and their implications are discussed in Sec. 8 together with
understanding of limiting factors for applying this method in production environment.
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2 Background
As this thesis is highly involved with network traffic interception, it is good to
understand what stages does the mobile device’s connection to the internet actually
involve. This section provides an overview of the connection to the destination
servers showing the possible data capture points en route. The network structure
information is followed by descriptions of various algorithms used in different parts
of this thesis.
2.1 Network structure
This section shows and describes various points involved with network traffic transport
together with their potential access to the relevant network traffic information.
Figure 1: Network stages for data capture
There are five distinguishable points at which the network information could be
gathered as shown in Fig. 1:
1. the mobile device itself. Here the data could be captured by an application.
As usually it is impossible to see all network traffic from within an application,
an alternative to it, is having a virtual network interface within the mobile
device and for example use VPN to force all of the available traffic through
this virtual interface.
2. the first network node that the device connects to, usually a local Wi-Fi or a
radio access network (RAN) access point of an mobile operator. It sees all of
the network packets going in and out of the phone and additionally can utilize
radio signal information.
3. the server through which the connection of a mobile phone is forced. The
enforcement can be done by configuring operator’s routing systems or by a
VPN connection.
14
4. all of the internet. Usually it is almost impossible to securely get all the packets
from a specific phone at this stage. Instead of looking at a specific device it
is possible to do a general study of the traffic going through a link you have
access to.
5. the server that a specific connection from the phone points to. The network
statistics at this point can be utilized by an application developer for example
to make better services. But mostly at this point one can only see the traffic
from own applications.
Most of the studies are executed on points 1-3. Examples of these studies shall be
presented with their results and and use cases in Sec. 3.
2.2 VPN and encryption
Over the topology shown in Fig. 1 a VPN can be used to connect stages 1 and 3
together. In scope of this thesis VPN host communicates over an IPSec protocol
described by Kaufman et al. in [12] and uses IKEv2 key exchgange described by
Kent and Seo in [13] during connection initiation.
One effect of this is that from connection’s perspective everything between these
two stages is considered as a single link and there is a sub network with separate
addressing, which makes address tracking much easier. Additionally everything is
forced through this link, making sure that all of the needed data will flow through
selected server for stage 3. On top of that this virtual link encrypts data it transfers,
which disallows eavesdropping over the connection between these two points.
The encryption mechanisms considered in this thesis are Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) and Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), because these hap-
pened to be the default selections of the test devices. Technical description of AES
can be found in Daemen’s and Vincent’s technical documentation [14]. And for 3DES
the description can be found in documentation by Barker et al. [15]. In case of AES
the block size is 128 bytes and in 3DES it is 64 bytes. Because the algorithms are
designed to only parse full blocks and the length of the data to be transferred is not
always dividable by the block size, padding must be applied to the data.
Padding usually adds some values with predefined rules to the end of the data
being sent, which naturally increases the size of the sent data. E.g. in 3DES
specification padding consists of values starting from 0 and increasing until the block
is full (00, 01, 02...) and to ensure right parsing of the data in cases the data length
is divisible by the block size, another block of pure padding is added to the end. [16]
As the encryption algorithms considered in this thesis parse data in small blocks,
the same key could be applied many times. This degrades security because for
example if same message would be sent several times someone could try to predict
which message it is by judging from the context and be able to infer the key from
this message. An obvious solution of changing the encryption key very often is not
practical. To fix this issue various encryption modes exist, the one considered in
this thesis is called Cipher Block Chaining (CBC). CBC goes through data block
by block and every time before encryption it XORs previous ciphered block with
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the current plaintext block. This way even if the same block is encrypted twice the
result will depend on the previous block and probably be different. [17]
Additionally Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) can be used,
which in conjunction with encryption provides authenticity, integrity and secrecy of
sent messages. More information on HMAC, can be found in Turner’s documenta-
tion [18]. A lot of functions exist for calculating the hashes for HMAC, for example
Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) is used in this thesis. The output of the hashing
function can also also truncated for example to 96 bytes for bandwidth savings. More
specifics on full encapsulation procedures can be found in Dorsway’s and Madson’s
documentation [19].
2.3 Machine Learning
One option for utilizing of parsed data from VPN is to feed it into machine learning
algorithms. Two algorithms are considered in this thesis, namely Support Vector
Classifier (SVC) and Random Forest.
SVC is considered to be a good machine learning method of data classification,
and is based on setting data to hyper planes, defining a kernel for splitting of the
data and applying the split on data points being classified. A description of the
method with examples and implementations is given in a guide by Hsu et al. [20].
Random Forest on the other hand, is originally described in Breiman’s article [21]
and is an extension of Bagging method from his earlier article [22]. It is a decision
tree algorithm, meaning that during the training phase, the algorithm comes up
with a set of consecutive if clauses which can be visualized like a tree. Starting from
the root of the tree, the process systematically descends by selecting the matching
answer at each node. The process ends in a leaf of the tree which states the predicted
class for given data. Having only one decision tree is usually not enough, because the
data is not always very consistent and extracted features may vary between different
data points of one class. Having multiple different trees allows looking at the data
from many perspectives and thus making better decisions.
One of the biggest problems in generating multiple trees is that while training
them on a same set of data the resulting trees might be very similar or even duplicates
of each other. Thus different methods are applied to ensure that every new tree
brings some value to the classifier. A method considered in this thesis includes two
levels of randomness. Firstly each new tree is trained on a random subset of ground
truth data, this is called Bagging. In addition to that Random Forest uses only a
randomly selected subset of features on each node. This adds more variation into
the trees as each node does not see the whole picture and makes the classifier more
robust. All in all Random Forests are reasoned by the law of large numbers, which
in concatenation with randomness in correct places yields very good results.
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3 Literature Review
This section informs about different use cases and possibilities driving the studies
related to mobile devices. First looking into general mobile usage statistics that
could be gathered for example by mobile network operators, it can be seen that
surprisingly many things are deducible from available data.
3.1 Phone event analysis
This section shall handle the information about mobile phone usage, which can be
gathered by the mobile network operators. Operators generally keep this information
to themselves, as it is quite personal, but can share it in some cases with other
parties.
To estimate the wealth of population in different areas Blumenstock et al. in [9]
utilize various statistics extracted from mobile phone usage in Rwanda. This approach
allowed generating very detailed wealth maps as well as prediction of single individual’s
status. Wang et al. [10] manage to approximate age, income and even the residence
region based only on a graph of interactions between pairs of users.
Another example of using user interactions is predicting the spread of epidemics.
[2–4] have studied the spread of infections like malaria and HIV in Africa and noticed
features in mobile communications which correlate strongly with infection spread.
In [5] Frias-Martinez et al. give an example of utilization of this information in case
of H1N1 spread in Mexico and claim that the impact of the virus was reduced with
help of their study by 6-10% compared to simulation without intervention.
When limiting oneself only to the locations people have visited, a lot can be told
as well. Using mobile devices is more or less a unique way to gather location tracking
information, because it is easy to organize, cheap and quite precise and additionally
there are no other feasible ways to gather it. Of course the precise location of devices
is not always available, but even knowing the operator’s transmitter to which the
phone is connected at an instance of time gives vast possibilities.
One way of using location information is for example optimization of roads for
cars or public transport routes. A good optimization example is presented in [23],
where Cici et al. show that sharing cars could drop number of cars in Madrid by
67% if people would not mind having a little longer work trips. Giradin et al. give
an example of how to optimize tourist business in [24], by knowing what places they
like to visit and when. In [6] Linardi et al. even suggest, that it is possible to predict
some violence outbreaks, by looking at societal tension which is reflected by the
mobility of people.
3.2 Network usage analysis
As popularity of having constant internet access on mobile devices is growing, it is
possible to dig deeper into phone usage to extract more valuable information. For
example by looking at the amounts of generated traffic it is possible to optimize the
network. In [25] Kumar et al. show that only 40% of base stations are needed most
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of the time, which would allow rest of the stations to enter sleep mode and save quite
a lot of energy. A study reported by Yu et al. [26] shows that by predicting future
networking events it is possible to reduce the energy consumption during inactivity
time by 56%. Espada et al. [27] and Shafiq et al. [28] show that different base stations
get different kinds of traffic and on top of that the stations with similar kind of traffic
are often close to each other, thus allowing to assign applications to places where
they are popular. [29] Also it is for example possible to prove, that mobile traffic
appears more often from well charged phones and from non-home locations as shown
by Soikkeli and Riikonen in [30].
3.3 Detecting fraud by analyzing network traffic
Next when concentrating only on the traffic related to one mobile device it is for
example possible to detect fraud in application’s advertisement, as some developers
prefer to make money on placing advertisements into their apps instead of requiring
users to pay. There is a possibility to cheat the advertisement counter to think that
the ad has been displayed or even clicked. In [31] Crussell et al. propose a way
to detect these frauds by running the app in a simulator and looking at generated
connections. [32]
Nowadays malware is also an emerging problem on mobile phones, as the mobile
phone user base and the amount of personal data stored on these phones are both large.
On top of that phones are almost constantly connected to the network allowing the
developers of malware to communicate with their creation and utilize it. Therefore a
good approach for detection of malicious applications is by monitoring network traffic
and many times information about things like memory and battery consumption are
also used. [32]
It must be noted that machine learning is very popular in this scene. Shabtai et
al. [33] propose to build predictive models, which after training are able to detect
anomalies and tell if the phone has malware installed. The algorithm utilizes a lot of
different metrics gathered from the phone, including features extracted from network
communication. Su et al. [34] on the other hand, try to prevent malicious applications
from even getting onto phones by running the applications in virtual environments
and test phones beforehand and feeding their network traffic into machine learning
algorithms. Another approach is looking at the connection destinations initiated by
the phone, Wei et al. [35] and Zaman et al. [36] both demonstrate that this approach
works well as long as mobile telephone’s DNS traffic can be monitored.
There are also applications which are not necessarily considered malicious, but
send sensitive information about the users into internet. In the worst case, this
information is not even encrypted, thus allowing anybody with ability to monitor
the network to see this data and even identify to whom it belongs. Collecting this
data is not always bad, one use case could be targeted advertisement which would
lessen the annoyance for the users and provide better marketing results. Therefore
some advertisement libraries collect this information and for example in [37] a study
is performed by Kuzuno and Tonami to detect the cases where this information is
not transferred securely. [32]
18
3.4 Device usage analysis
Continuing deeper into network traffic analysis it is also interesting to study how
exactly users utilize the functionality of their devices and installed applications.
Multiple facts can be deduced solely based on network traffic captured from the
phone’s connection to internet. For example Ruffing et al. could identify device’s
operating system in their publication [38], which relies on frequency of transmitted
packets. This kind of approach allows 70% accuracy already during first 30 seconds
of packet interception from most popular mobile operating systems. When the used
application is known and traffic capture is longer the approach reaches near perfect
results.
Instead of detecting operating systems, one might want to know which applications
are in use currently. Sometimes this includes applications done by other developers
so that there is no access to their inner statistics. One of the use cases could be
quality of service prioritization based on an application detected from the network
traffic itself. For example Lu et al. build a prioritization system in [39], which uses
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to limit unwanted Peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic in mobile
networks so that other users will have enough bandwidth.
In [40] Finamore et al. deduce, that Youtube (an on demand video service) is
used very similarly on mobile and non-mobile devices with exception that mobile
users finish their videos less often. Furthermore users can be fingerprinted by their
habits of phone usage gotten from for example network traffic logs. This enables
tracking and detecting individuals to some extent even in cases where user switches
the device. In [7] Verde et al. present a machine learning system, which can detect
specific user’s traffic even when the user is behind a NAT, thus sharing an IP address
with multiple other users.
In [8] the encrypted connections of the mobile phones are meddled with in such
a way that Rao et al. can see the plain traffic and know exact statistics about it.
As the mobile device tries to start an encrypted connection with the destination
server, the author’s server gets in the middle and acts as the destination server for
the mobile device and vise versa. This method is called SSL bumping, it peeks into
the actual traffic of the device, thus fully invading privacy. Rao et al. do not present
any analysis over time, thus if something changes, the whole system might need to
be retrained. Authors also mention that some applications detect the SSL bumping
and do not accept the connection, in the future it is possible that more applications
will start doing that, thus blocking this approach. Additionally authors show how
applications send personal statistics in an unprotected way over the network and
analyze how governments and internet service providers can manipulate what users
see. A similar result is shown in a study [41], where Alan and Kaur achieve an
application detection accuracy of 88% in best case, while having almost 10 times
more applications as Rao et al. in the testing dataset. However the paper lacks
proper manual usage tests which could show that the method does not actually work
well.
The two studies with best results in application identification are mentioned
by Conti et al. in [32]. In both studies research groups reach 96% identification
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accuracy at best. The difference between these two studies is that in the study by
Mongkolluksamee et al. [42] the traffic is captured on the phone itself, while Taylor
et al. [43] are tapping on the connection on the network. In both cases Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) headers are required
so these methods will not perform well when for example an IPSec is being used by
the phone or by an application.
Lastly it is even possible to detect the actions users are performing inside the
applications by only looking at network traffic and sometimes even some specifics
of these actions. These studies mostly target apps intended for communication and
social interactions like instant messengers and social networks respectively. Apps
in both of these categories often contain very sensitive information about the users.
Works by Coull and Dyer [44] and Park and Kim [45] concentrate on communication
category and gain near 100% accuracy on detecting actions with Apple’s iMessage on
iOS and Korean KakaoTalk on Android respectively. On top of that Coull and Dyer
in [44] can even tell which language is being used for communication with over 80%
accuracy. Conti et al. show very good results in [46] for such social applications as
Facebook and Twitter as well as productivity applications, such as Dropbox, Evernote
and Gmail. Overall it is quite scary how many things can be deduced by monitoring
solely the network traffic emerging from a mobile device.
3.5 Ground truth acquisition methods
Ground truth generation is the first logical step to approach identification of appli-
cations from network traffic. It is important to have a good definition of what can
be considered reliable information and what kind of properties and limitations the
information could have. On top of that one has to be able to gather this information
in a feasible manner, this is especially important when machine learning algorithms
are used, as the required amount of data for teaching these algorithms reliably is
usually very large.
In [47] Korczyński and Duda propose an application detection based on hostname
matching of the IPs the application tries to connect to. Using this matching flows are
mapped to specific applications thus teaching the classifiers based on that. Authors
mention that sometimes applications connect to IPs, which do not have a public
hostname and thus these flows will not be utilized for detection. Another flaw of
this approach is that for example one developer’s different applications might have
connections to the same endpoints, thus making it impossible to distinguish between
these apps.
Similarly to Korczyński and Duda [47] in [41] Alan and Kaur collect traffic from
a node on the network. But instead of looking at whole traffic dumps, the interest is
shifted to the traffic being transmitted immediately after an application is opened.
To gather this dataset they use two tablets and two phones and automate application
launches on these devices. The applications are selected from 1595 most popular
applications in application store and the data gathering is ran for about a month
generating about 86 thousand recorded application launches. Launching is executed
over the Android Debug Bridge which allows device control over USB cable and
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traffic is captured with a Linux program: tcpdump.
Taylor et al. [48] describe in detail their generation of a dataset containing user
actions. They utilize a tool called monkeyrunner to automate user actions within
the studied applications and record the traffic on a network node saving the data
into CSV format. Each data point corresponds to a received packet and contains
information about the reception time, involved IP addresses and ports, packet’s
size, protocol and in case of TCP, the protocol’s flags. Authors also propose a split
of traffic into bursts which are defined as time windows of set length and multiple
intercepted packets. These bursts are the ones being assigned to applications and
thus allow detection of app in near real time. Authors also mention the possibility of
simulating the devices for generating data thus enabling scalability of the method.
Alternatively in [49] Wang et al. place their collection point into an encrypted
Wi-Fi environment. In their approach, the captured traffic is split by MAC addresses
to identify the devices. The results show that for example it is possible to make a
sophisticated prediction of the device’s operating system. On the other hand, the
study is done in information security context and the authors were not interested in
inferring a large variety of applications. They composed a training set of a very few
apps and ran and annotated by hand to get these results.
Instead of automating data generation, Le et al. [50] propose a crowd sourcing
approach in which an application generating ground truth data is given for users
to install. On top of gathering ground truth, the application provides services like
detection of privacy leaks and freedom of selection of which applications can be
monitored thus giving users some gain from installing the application. The author’s
application modifies the outgoing packets inside the mobile device by adding the
application that generated this traffic into the packets. The traffic is then routed
trough the author’s VPN server, which extracts the required features from the
transmission and forwards it to the internet. Additionally authors also think about
the nature of different network protocols and to have the test setup as close to reality
as possible they use UDP in their VPN tunnel, because it resembles IP’s behavior.
A similar approach is introduced by Iwai and Nakao in [51], where instead of having
an application, modified smartphones are handed to people. The modifications also
add the running application into the traffic flows and the data is again intercepted
on a VPN server.
3.6 Detection techniques
With available ground truth a suitable algorithm has to be selected, to utilize the
data and perform the classification.
3.6.1 Markov chain based approaches
Korczyński and Duda propose in their work [47] a Markov chain based approach,
which has discrete time states and transitions between these states are defined
randomly with certain probabilities. Transmission control features are extracted from
packets headed away from the user, these features are enumerated and considered
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as states mentioned above. It is also possible that multiple control features are
embedded in a single packet, thus creating additional states with combination of
these features. During traffic analysis these states are found and the probabilities of
moving from one state to the next are calculated by the relative number of occurrences
of this transition. This also requires two special states that are not extracted from
packets: an entrance state and an exit state. These two states behave much like the
others, except for one cannot re-enter entrance state or return from exit state.
By having a model like this one can create a metric for each captured set of
packets, which shows how often each state is visited during the connection. The
Markov chain model also allows calculating the probabilities of each state thus
enabling easy predictions of which application is actually the one generating this
traffic. [47]
Shen et al. [52] extend the Markov chain method by introducing second-order
Markov chains, which calculates the distribution for the next state based not only
on the current state but also on the previous one. Because for each transition a
knowledge of two previous states is required, the entrance state for the chain embeds
probabilities for the next two states. This way when we take the next step after
entering, we know the required states for future calculations.
3.6.2 Machine learning based approaches
Instead of creating highly customized models it is possible to use general approaches
for classification. For example in [50] Le et al. used SVC and got results ranging
in accuracy from 73% to 96%. These are good values but overall SVC tends to be
much more computationally expensive than Random Forests discussed next.
A good example of the difference between SVC and Random Forest is given in [48],
where Taylor et al. notice that Random Forests are almost twice as fast and require
half of the disk space compared to the SVC, while giving better classification results.
Therefore the Taylor et al. used this algorithm in their following work [43] and
achieved good results. Conti et al. used this approach in [46] as well. Additionally
Mongkolluksamee et al. [42] mention that Random Forests includes information
about feature importances by default, which are very useful for analysis.
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4 Problem statement
It is very important for many companies to know how people use applications and
mobile devices in general to gain better knowledge of their target audience. With the
strengthened mobile application isolation allowing to see only the app start and stop
events, new ways must be found to get this information. Additionally applications
are encrypting their newtork traffic more often, thus there is no use of peeking into
the transmitted packet contents.
However it is still possible to find out application start and stop timestamps and
the device’s network traffic which can be captured over a VPN server. Thus the goal
is to implement a classifier suite which would detect the application currently opened
on a mobile device accurately. As there are already works with machine learning
based approaches for detection of applications based on network traffic, an extension
on such approach should be presented with utilization of application start and stop
timestamps and provide better results.
To create and evaluate the classifier, the following goals must be met. There is a
need for a proper automated environment which would generate enough ground truth
data for testing purposes. The environment should be able to generate trustworthy
data with minimal human intervention to show that the approach can be scaled up
and automated properly.
Additionally the scalability requires evaluation of storage and processing require-
ments to see if the system could handle many devices simultaneously. A cross-device
tests also need to be performed to see if there is a need to train on every available
device separately. The ability to filter the non-trained applications should also be
assessed, as it is difficult to have a classifier trained for all of the applications on the
market continuously.
As scalability issues are handled the application detection quality needs to be
assessed in several ways, to not only know how many percent of application launches
are detected right, but to also see how various applications are cross-detected with each
other. The cross-detection studies should allow seeing if there are logical explanations
to the problems between particular applications which could be addressed in the
future.
It is also important to evaluate the system in non-optimal situations to assess
how it would work in reality. Naturally manual device usage should be tested as
it is the actual usage for the product created in this thesis. Also very bad network
conditions should be tested as the detection is aimed at mobile devices, which tend
to move a lot and naturally can have problems with network connection.
Overall the result of these goals should provide a good insight into feasibility of
using this approach in a real production environment.
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5 Design
Before beginning the work, potential ways for solving the problem have to be selected.
Considering the ideas presented in Sec. 3.5, the following decisions were made. In
scope of this thesis the crowd sourcing approaches are infeasible for the difficulty
of finding enough people to generate enough data in a relatively short time span.
Additionally there are no good methods for being sure that these people will not cheat
or make mistakes during data generation, if they have to do something manually.
In context of this thesis the hostname matching approach is considered unreliable
and cannot be used as ground truth, as the number and variety in studied applications
is higher than in Korczyńskis and Dudas work [47]. Therefore an approach similar to
Alans and Kaurs study [41] is selected in this thesis. As the approach studies only
the application’s start time traffic, it is simple to implement and provides very high
confidence in detection.
As for algorithm selection, following options were considered. Because encrypted
network traffic is used, it is impossible to extract anything sensible from the captured
packet payloads. Therefore for example DPI approaches cannot be utilized, as these
rely on the ability of reading the payloads. Thus with in this case only the packet
headers can be used.
The Markov chain based solutions presented in Sec. 3.6.1 are very elegant, but as
this thesis works on encrypted channels the connections look much more monotonic
from the outside of the channel. Although it could be possible to deduce commu-
nication’s progression based on the limited information given by packet headers, it
would probably not work very well, as the seen flags are not necessarily reflecting
the characteristics of the encrypted data. Additionally the detection rates given by
the works that utilized Markov chain approach were not as good as the works with
machine learning approaches.
The Sec. 3.6.2 shows, that Random Forest is noticeably more popular and provides
better performance compared to SVC. Other algorithms of higher complexity shall
not be used for detection purposes in this thesis as for example Neural Network
based algorithms could potentially perform better, but require a lot more learning
data than the feasible amounts in scope of this work. Additionally as the ground
truth data might contain some impurities, it is important that selected algorithm can
handle that to some extent. Thus Random Forest is the algorithm of choice in this
thesis, as it provides resilience to small impurities in the data, is easy to configure
and naturally gives information about detection quality.
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6 Implementation
This section handles the configurations of the devices involved in this thesis and
the algorithms used for application detection as well as calculation of metrics. Two
devices have been used in this thesis and are referenced as a phone device and a
tablet device, additionally manual tests in Sec. 7 include a second tablet device with
newer OS. The second tablet is identical to the first one in scope of configuration
and systems, and is featured in only one test, where the actual differences will
be described. While the implementation is tested on these particular devices, the
proposed approach is generic as it can be used with almost any device connected to
the internet.
First the devices and their configurations will be explained, which is followed by
the definitions of terminology and data gathering and extraction used in this thesis.
Then the actual data generation and parsing process is explained, followed by the
evaluation metrics definitions.
6.1 VPN and device setup
The traffic capturing in this thesis is done on a remote server through which all
mobile device’s traffic has been routed with VPN which is configured according to
the Sec. 2.2 section on a strongSwan [53] based server. strongSwan manages routing
tables through iptables [54].
To focus only on the interesting packets, the capture points are set within iptables
with nflog, which allows specific definition of logging point during routing process. The
actual capture points are in the mangle table at INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD
points. At these points VPN packet addresses have already been changed to VPN’s
subnet range 10.0.0.0/17, thus tracking IPs of devices is much easier. There are also
following filters applied to discard useless data:
• For INPUT source is from VPN’s subnet
• For OUTPUT destination is to VPN’s subnet
• For FORWARD source or destination is from VPN’s subnet
The tunneling algorithms of the test devices as shown by the strongSwan’s sta-
tus command are AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA1_96 for the phone device and
3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA1_96 for the tablet device. In this case HMAC config-
uration is the same on both devices, so it should not affect detection performance.
On the other hand, the encryption algorithms differ and especially the difference in
block sizes as explained in Sec. 2.2 should greatly affect the application detection
performance, as the detection relies on packet sizes which in place are depending on
padding lengths.
With VPN all of the mobile device’s connections are forced through the VPN
server The server also can thus save the captured packets using tcpdump into .pcap
files. These files are named with the capture start timestamp for ease of use.
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Additionally mobile devices have a program installed, that collects data about
application launches including application names and exact launch and close times-
tamps. The program is intended to run constantly in the background, in addition to
generation of launch logs, it also tries to keep VPN connection running. This data is
very important for automation of application running and mapping it to the network
captures.
6.2 Flow definition
After the network traffic is captured it is parsed into networking flows from now
on referred to just as flows, which are defined as a group of packets related to one
transmission instance between two endpoints on the network. Applications create
flows when they want to send or retrieve data from the network. Splitting into flows
aids traffic classification, as flows related to specific application launch are expected
to start and end within the application’s running time. Therefore if there are flows
that started before the application opened or after it closed, the probability of this
flow belonging to some other application is high. The separation of flows is done
mostly via a quadruple consisting of network addresses and ports of both endpoints.
Flows can contain longer exchanges for example in cases where data access requires
authentication or the objects transmitted depend on previous ones. In some cases
previous flows can also be continued so that no new handshakes are needed, this
however is not considered in scope of this thesis.
The focus is only on TCP and UDP protocols as these are most frequently applied
for application data transmission. UDP, being a stateless protocol, does not reveal
information about connection state without looking further into packet contents.
Therefore UDP flows are mostly determined by the address-port quadruple, but
on top of that there is a timeout of one minute used in this thesis. If there are no
UDP packets with given quadruple for the timeout duration, the flow is considered
closed and in case new packets with same address-port combination emerge, these
are considered to be a part of next flow.
Similarly to UDP, TCP flows also have a timeout, but in this case the value is set
to five seconds, as TCP is a stateful protocol. The statefulness means that the flow
constantly has a state such as established, listening or closing. During waiting TCP
engine usually sends keep-alive messages, which are naturally seen in the traffic. On
top of that TCP keeps track of transmitted and received packets, thus one can tell
if the data actually reached the other end. This gives a good way of following the
flows from initialization until close.
The actual flow extraction is done by Bro Network Security Monitor [55] as it
allows custom scripting and can go through captured files very quickly. On top of
that flow extraction tries to avoid looking at flows with irregularities to keep the
data clean for machine learning. The irregular flows are detected by Wireshark’s
terminal version tshark [56], which provides an easy to use TCP protocol dissector.
The filtering removes flows which contain one of the following:
• TCP retransmission, which happens in case some of the packets did not reach
the receiver and are requested to be resent.
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• TCP duplicate ACK, which happens in case when the sender did not receive
an acknowledgment of reception and to speed things up sends the same data
again.
• TCP reset flag, which indicates that something in the connection did not add
up and the whole connection should be dropped.
6.3 Feature extraction
To utilize machine learning one must define and extract numeric features from the
flows described in Sec. 6.2. The encrypted data in the packets seen on the wire does
not give much information for extraction. Additionally time related features like
packet inter-arrival times cannot be used, as varying network conditions would mess
up the features easily. Thus this work focuses only on packet sizes, direction and
order of arrival.
The separation into flows is useful in this situation, as just looking at all of the
packets related to one device will result in a lot of noise. For example applications
might share some libraries which generate similar traffic and separation into flows
will allow locating these common patterns, thus giving them lower priority during
the detection phase.
Feature extraction generates in total 70 features per flow, yet some of the features
might be left blank in case it is not possible to calculate these values. As we are
getting both TCP and UDP flows, this is one of the features used and it is named
’proto’. Next, the packets inside the flow are grouped in three ways, depending on
their direction: packets that originate from device, packets that are sent to the device
and all packets together. These are reflected as prefixes ’out_’, ’in_’ and ’total_’
respectively. This grouping can help distinguish cases where for example mobile
devices request going to the server is always the same, but the server’s answers may
differ.
From each of these groups packet count is extracted as a feature and named
as count. On top of that following features are extracted from packet lengths in
captured order: average value, skewness, variance, standard deviation, mean absolute
deviation, kurtosis, 11 quantiles ranging from 0 to 1 and autocorrelation. Their
nicknames are ’len_avg’, ’len_skew’, ’len_var’, ’len_std’, ’len_mad’, ’len_kurtosis’,
’len_quantile_i’, ’autocorr_i’ respectively where i is the number of quantile or the
correlation shift index.
Following equations show how feature values are calculated. Xi is the i-th
measurement, X¯ is the average measurement value and n = |X| is the measurement
count. The skew in this thesis is calculated with
η(X) =
√
n(n− 1)
n− 2
1
n
∑n
i=1(Xi − X¯)3
( 1
n
∑n
i=1(Xi − X¯)2)3/2
(1)
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For kurtosis, the equation
κ(X) = n
2 − 1
(n− 2)(n− 3)
1
n
∑n
i=1(Xi − X¯)4
( 1
n
∑n
i=1(Xi − X¯)2)2
− 3 (n− 1)
2
(n− 2)(n− 3) (2)
is used. And the standard deviation is calculated by
σ(X) =
∑n
i=1(Xi − X¯)2
n− 1 (3)
in this thesis. Standard deviation is a square root of variance. Both are calculated
with delta degrees of freedom set to one. Mean absolute deviation is calculated with
ψ(X) =
∑n
i=1 |Xi − X¯|
n
(4)
Quantiles include the deciles, min and max of given set of packet lengths. Deciles
are selected position-wise from a sorted set of given values. In case the position falls
between data points, the value is taken from the linear interpolation between the
two data points.
The aforementioned features are basic statistical features, that represent the
data in a well defined vector, making it suitable for machine learning. However
these features do not capture information about the order of arrival, which is a good
way of separating conversations. For capturing information about actual order of
the arriving packets autocorrelation is used. The implementation uses convolution
theorem, which states that multiplication in frequency domain equals to convolution
in time domain as shown in Andrews’ and Phillips’ book [57]. First the deviation of
each of the packet sizes is taken by substracting their mean from them, resulting
vector is then Fourier transformed. The absolute values of the transformed vector
are squared as autocorrelation is a convolution of the vector to itself. The resulting
vector is then inverse Fourier transformed and normalized by the sum of squares of
deviation values. Lastly a vector of the size of the original sample vector is taken from
the Fourier inversed data starting from the left side. As there are four autocorrelation
features for each vector, they are selected as evenly spaced samples between the start
and the middle of the autocorrelation vector, because autocorrelation is symmetrical.
In case the number of values is not enough to fill the four samples, the samples
are filled with zeroes. Naturally when the number of samples is not enough to do
autocorrelation at all, the feature values are set to zero.
In TCP flows it is also possible to predict the packets, that only acknowledge
reception without carrying any data, by defining their length to be 52 bytes. This
creates a feature of ratio of acknowledgment packets in comparison to total packet
count, which could potentially show how single sided a TCP connection is and is
noted as ’just_ack_ratio’.
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6.4 Ground truth
As the infrastructure is defined, it is possible to define the actual data gathering
processes. Solutions and decisions for ground truth generation were selected because
they were the easiest and the most straightforward at the time of implementation.
Figure 2: Location of controlling PC in the whole network structure. Red lines
denote the paths used by controller for coordination by sending launch and capture
commands. Blue lines denote the path of encrypted VPN traffic which gets captured
for analysis.
The data generation process is coordinated by a Linux PC which sends commands
through Secure Shell (SSH) to the mobile devices and the server over the paths
denoted in the Fig. 2 with red lines. Channels of communication between the
coordinator and the devices are separated from the blue colored capturing path of
the ground truth packets, thus having no effect on the data.
The sequence of the commands is following, first stop all running applications
on the device and the network capture on the VPN server and wait for 5 seconds.
Next start new network capture and wait additional 5 seconds to be sure it has really
started. Then a randomly chosen application is opened on the mobile device and
after 20 seconds, the application is killed. The process continues from the start of
this paragraph until stopped. On process stop the running application is killed and
the network capture is stopped.
After the data generation process has been running, the ground truth data can
be collected from the mobile devices and the VPN server as mentioned in Sec. 6.1.
From the VPN’s pcap files the flows are extracted according to the process described
in Sec. 6.3. The real application launch data is also fed into the alignment engine. For
each application start timestamp given by mobile device, this engine finds the pcap
file with the highest timestamp which is still smaller than the opening timestamp. In
that file, each flow’s start and stop timestamps are checked against application open
and close timestamps and if the flow is fully within the application running time it
is considered a ground truth datapoint. These datapoints are then saved with their
respective application for machine learning.
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6.5 Machine learning
As enough of the ground truth data has been gathered, it is possible to utilize it for
training and testing the application detection algorithms. Scikit-learn [58] allows
easy creation of a Random Forest Classifier, which can be trained with the ground
truth data. For most basic evaluation the ground truth is split into training and
testing and a classifier trained on the training data is evaluated over the testing data.
As Random Forests have only a few tweakable parameters they are relatively easy to
use. In this thesis following parameters are tweaked for improved performance:
• n_estimators: number of random decision trees generated for the forest
• max_depth: maximum number of decisions to make in each tree to get to
result
• max_leaf_nodes: maximum number of decision endpoints for the tree
After the classifier object has been trained with ground truth data, it is possible
to get some information about the classifier. In this thesis the feature_importances_
data structure from the classifier object is used to get the sizes of the roles of every
single feature in the detection process.
For all flows with features in a set F a classifier γ produces a vector of probabilities
γ(Ff ) = G = [G1, G2, ..., Gc] for flow index f and class number c ∈ C. Class numbers
are connected with the set of application runs A. Functions ξ and ϵ shall return the
start time and end time respectively for both F and A. Thus a set of flow features
which have been recorded during single application run r is defined by
Pr = {γ(Ff )|Ff ∈ F : ξ(Ff ) ⩾ ξ(Ar) ∧ ϵ(Ff ) ⩽ ϵ(Ar) ∧ ϵ(Ff ) ⩽ ξ(Ar) + s} (5)
with s being the time threshold for an application to be considered starting. The
three ways the application prediction is calculated from launches’ associated flows in
this thesis are shown below. The first way
o = maxcount
c
({argmax(G)|G ∈ Pr}) (6)
gives an equal affection to each flow prediction during application running regardless
of probability distribution. Second way
b = argmax
c∈C
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
G∈Pr
Gc
⎫⎬⎭ (7)
takes the probability distributions of each flow into account. Third way
h = argmax
c∈C
⎧⎨⎩ ∑
G∈P ∗r
Gc
⎫⎬⎭ , P ∗r = {G|G ∈ Pr : max(G) ⩾ τ} (8)
discards the flows with which classifier was not confident and sums the leftover class
probability distributions. In this thesis the default value 0.4 is used for τ , because a
quick test showed that this way not too many flows get discarded, but the detection
gets noticeably better.
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6.6 Metrics used
As the predictions produced by the Random Forest algorithm are not always right,
there is a need for metrics to assess the goodness of the detection. These metrics are
calculated with a vector of true class indexes T , a vector of predicted class indexes
P , a set of classes C and the Kroneker Delta function δ. Accuracy
α =
∑|T |
i=1 δTiPi
|T | (9)
shows the fraction of predictions that were right. Precision
ϕ =
∑
c∈C
∑N
i=1 δTiPiδPic
max(∑Ni=1 δPic, 1)
|C| (10)
shows how trustworthy a predictions is on average. Recall
ρ =
∑
c∈C
∑N
i=1 δTiPiδTic
max(∑Ni=1 δTic, 1)
|C| (11)
shows how good is the per class recognition on average. The maximum selections
in Eq. 10 and Eq. 11 are added, because if some class has no data at all, the value
for average calculation should be set to 0. Lastly F1 Score
f1 = 2
ϕρ
ϕ+ ρ (12)
is the harmonic mean of precision Eq. 10 and recall Eq. 11.
In addition to overall accuracy α, these metrics highlight the badly detected
applications with low number of datapoints. Because of the low number of datapoints,
these cases will have a weak effect on α, but simultaneously the effect on the rest of
the metrics will be much stronger.
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7 Analysis
After having enough data to analyze, the algorithms can be evaluated. This section
starts with the general analysis of results on the entire dataset, which is followed
by an in depth look at the actual per application recognition. Next the processing
and storing requirements are evaluated by tweaking the classifier’s parameters to
optimize it’s size. Application set size is also evaluated by trying the detection on
different sized subsets. On top of that the features are evaluated to see which of them
are actually important and can some of them be fully dropped from the process.
In addition to that following tests with limited conditions are introduced thus
showing possibilities of utilization of these methods in real world. First detection of
unknown applications is tested to see if classifier can filter the untrained applications,
then cross-device detection is checked to see if every device has to have it’s own
training set. Lastly tests mimicking reality are performed, where firstly a very bad
link is introduced to the network to see how the filtering of bad flows performs and
then the detection of applications ran by hand is tested.
The main data collection for this thesis has been running for 50 days on the
two devices according to the process described in Sec. 6.4. With varying technical
difficulties of connection drops between the devices the data was not collected
optimally. On top of that, because it was not feasible to properly filter out the
cases where e.g. VPN connection had dropped, the application launches with no
traffic at all have been ignored. Thus the applications which did not send data were
automatically filtered out, which naturally affects statistics.
7.1 General results
Overall application detection has been evaluated over 197 apps and 132116 recorded
launches on two devices. Application sets have been different because of the difference
in the device OSes. The phone device had 126 apps and 52957 valid launches and
the tablet device 184 apps and 79159 valid launches, where launches have at least
one valid flow. Table 1 contains full test results for the whole dataset with each of
the previously presented per app flow concatenation methods. The classifier used in
the table can be considered as the best performing Random Forest classifier in this
thesis as there are no limiting parameters set. The models are trained and tested on
the same devices, thus giving better results.
The detection for the phone device performs worse than the tablet device in
every test. This badness can be explained by the higher blocksize of AES, which
hides actual data lengths in packets better with bigger padding. On top of padding
problems the phone device might have more background processes and apps that do
not close properly and continue traffic generation in the background. The phone’s
operating system was different and experienced more problems with keeping the
VPN up for longer periods of time which negatively affected the number of valid app
launches.
All of the resulting metrics are at best with the thresholded probability sums Eq. 8,
but also the detected count decreases compared other detection approaches. This
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likely happens because some apps do not necessarily have much traffic of their own,
which allows the device’s background traffic to affect the decision and because the
background traffic is found in conjunction with several apps, the result becomes
inaccurate.
On the other hand, as the threshold filters out uncertain flows, it is possible
that no valid flows are to be found for specific application launch removing it from
the statistics. Thus it is possible to compare the threshold’s effect in another way,
where for subindex t standing for thresholded with Eq. 8 and subindex n standing
for non-thresholded with Eq. 7 a following result is seen with every device and the
non-rounded data from the Table 1
αtιt < αnιn (13)
with differences in order of per mils. This shows that if the launches that are filtered
out by the threshold are added back into calculation as non-detected values, the result
would actually be worse than without threshold. In other words this means that the
non thresholded approach actually detects more apps right than the thresholded one.
Thus it is possible to find the optimal threshold that would result in the maximum
detection score, which could be especially useful if the right and wrong predictions
had defined weights.
The most predicted app approach with Eq. 6 disregards the certainty values of the
classifier which results in the worst performance among the three algorithms. This
shows that the Random Forest’s certainty values work well and should be utilized.
On top of that utilization of the certainty values does not rise the workload for
processing by much, making the most predicted app approach even less useful.
The precision ϕ values in the Table 1 show that the classifier’s stated results per
class are most often right but the recall ρ values show that less often are all of the
class’ instances detected as this class.
Table 1: Table of scores with 75% of the original dataset evaluated against 25% of
the data four times and averaged so that every data point gets evaluated once. The
default parameters for classifier were used with 10 decision trees and unlimited depth
and leaf nodes. Metrics are calculated for most predicted app with Eq. 6, probability
sums with Eq. 7 and thresholded probability sums Eq. 8.
Device Eq Detected count ι Accuracy α Precision ϕ Recall ρ F1 Score f1
Phone Eq. 6 52957 83% 77% 69% 71%
Phone Eq. 7 52957 90% 82% 78% 78%
Phone Eq. 8 50267 95% 86% 83% 84%
Tablet Eq. 6 79159 89% 96% 86% 89%
Tablet Eq. 7 79159 97% 98% 95% 96%
Tablet Eq. 8 78260 98% 99% 97% 97%
Together Eq. 6 132116 86% 92% 82% 84%
Together Eq. 7 132116 94% 96% 92% 93%
Together Eq. 8 128526 97% 97% 95% 96%
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7.2 Per-app evaluation
To see clearer how classification works, applications are studied separately in this
section. This performance evaluation can be done well with the help of confusion
matrices, where x-axis represents predictions and y-axis the truth values. Thus for
each combination of truth and prediction there is a point in matrix with the count of
the combination’s occurrence. However just plotting this matrix is not very practical
Figure 3: Confusion matrix plot without any modifications for both devices detected
by using thresholded probability sums with eq. Eq. 8
as the information is not scaled as seen in Fig. 3. On top of that with this many
classes one would like to zoom in and have most of the relevant cross detection
information in the zoom. Next a description of how these matrices were rearranged
better and an application cross detection analysis for each device shall be presented.
7.2.1 Confusion matrix arrangement
The optimization of the confusion matrices can be reformed into trying to bring all
the problematic cases as close as possible to the diagonal of right predictions. As the
classes are assigned indexes it is possible to optimize this assignment. Optimization
requires definition of a badness metric, which in this case for class indexes vector C
and a function mapping two classes to the number of occurrences for the truth and
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prediction pair ω(t, g) is defined with equation
β =
∑
t∈C
∑
g∈C
ω(t, g)|t− g| (14)
To minimize β a greedy algorithm is introduced, it finds the indexes tw, gw which
produce the worst term of the sum and swaps indexes of classes in such a way that
the classes which were indexed tw and gw have consecutive numbers. This is done as
long as local minima is found.
After that a downwards counter of size 400 is introduced. First for 150 moves a
random index pair is selected from one quarter of the best index pairs and rearranged
to be closer. Then for 250 moves the original shifting logic is applied. In case the
badness result gets better during counter’s operation, the counter is reset and the
process continues normally and in case the counter reaches 0 the process is stopped
and the best found indexation of classes is returned.
Figure 4: Sorted and normalized confusion matrix plot for both devices detected by
using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
The values of the sorted matrix are then separately normalized over both axes
so that there is one matrix with all row sums equal to one and another with all
columns sums equal to one. Lastly these two matrices are summed and each value is
divided by two resulting in a sorted matrix of confusions presented in Fig. 4. This
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last normalization needs to be done because applications with enough datapoints still
might have different numbers of the points, which would look like a bad detection in
the figures. Yet on the other hand, this normalization also strongly brings forward
applications which have only a few valid datapoints amplifying their data very
strongly. One way to avoid this badness would be to have separate images for
horizontal and vertical normalization, but this kind of doubling of plot counts would
not make much sense in this scope.
7.2.2 Apps on phone device
In the phone’s application detection confusion matrix in Fig. 5, it can be seen that
most of the applications are detected very well. Some of the problematic applications
have common mistakes with their neighbors. The vertical lines of mistakes mean
that several applications are detected wrongly as one app and horizontal lines show
that one application is detected as several different ones. The fact that in the Fig. 5
there are more vertical lines to be seen than horizontal, is in line with Table 1,
higher precision ϕ and lower recall ρ values for phone’s thresholded probability sums
method.
Figure 5: Sorted and normalized confusion matrix plot for phone device detected by
using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
Some of the apps with absolutely no right hits can be seen in Fig. 6. Here “Angry
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Birds Rio” are detected as “LinkedIn” and “Boom Beach” is detected as “Google
Mobile”. These two errors do not seem to make any sense, but in reality both of these
applications had only one proper launch in the dataset. This is probably because
these applications just did not need internet for functioning and thus mostly did not
generate any proper flows. Thus “Angry Birds Rio” and “Boom Beach” appear only
once in truth-prediction table and that one appearance time they are not trained
for classification, thus being detected as some other application with similar traffic
features. It is also possible that the predicted applications were not killed properly
once and thus generated flows in the background during the time the misclassified
applications were running.
Figure 6: Sorted and normalized and zoomed confusion matrix plot for phone device
detected by using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
In Fig. 7 lower right corner of the phone device’s confusion matrix is enlarged.
According to the image, the model seems to classify “Dice With Buddies” not too
well, but in reality “Yahtzee With Buddies” and “Hotels.com” have only 2 and 1
datapoints respectively, which makes them non-significant. The detection problems
with “Google Authenticator” are because the application does not have any network
traffic, thus if valid launches with traffic were recorded, the traffic had to be from
other apps running in the background. It is also possible that this traffic did not
actually belong to the “Lotto Results” or “AutoRap by Smule”, it might as well just
be OS’s background traffic which happened to be sent at the right moment.
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“QR Reader” in Fig. 7 being often detected as “Sudoku by Finger Arts”, “8 Ball
and Pool” and “Countdown”, could be for example explained by these applications
having similar advertisement libraries and “QR Reader” not having much other
network traffic.
Also in Fig. 7 Zynga’s games “Wizard of Oz Slots Free Casino” (WZ), “Willy
Wonka Slots” could also have erroneous detections with each other, as being of the
same type they might run similar statistics and activity gathering algorithms as well
as payment systems. On the other hand, the reason why some of WZ launches were
detected as “Disney Magic Kingdoms by Gameloft”, could happen because Gameloft
and Zynga might have shared libraries.
Figure 7: Sorted and normalized and zoomed confusion matrix plot for phone device
detected by using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
In Fig. 8 we have the most confusing apps of the phone’s application selection.
Figure shows that several applications that do not have anything special to do
with each other are detected as “DoubleDown Casino” there is no seemingly clear
explanation to this. A search for explanation was done by looking at Software
Development Kits (SDK) these applications use, which are shown in the Table 2.
The table, however, does not help this investigation too much as the most commonly
misclassified applications do not seem to use any common SDK’s with “DoubleDown
Casino”. Thus the only explaining factor defining the exact applications being mixed
up with “DoubleDown Casino” would be the fact that these applications were installed
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on the phone simultaneously. On top of that the “DoubleDown Casino” does not
seem to have any detection problems on the tablet, so it could have been some
technical issues on the phone device, or it is also possible that the higher blocksize of
the phone’s cryptoalgorithm pads in such a way that specifically these applications
get mixed up.
Table 2: “DoubleDown Casino”s used SDK’s presence in applications, which had
multiple detections as the DDCasino
DDCasino predictions /
Total Starts ZenDesk Metal Swift SIMD Image IO
Spotify Music 128/205
Cookie Jam 107/1092
Criminal Case 56/293 x
Wallpapers 48/258
Foap - sell your photos 26/319 x x
Voxer 18/86 x x
QuizUp 16/71 x
Kik 11/183 x x
7.2.3 Apps on tablet device
For the tablet device the full confusion matrix in Fig. 9 looks better, there are a
few random spots around, which represent false detection cases. As these spots are
very vague, they do not draw much attention, nor do they require much further
investigation. Overall the tablet device was much more stable during the data
generation, with most of the apps having at least 100 valid runs, the reason for this
could be the different OS it was running. On top of that the shorter padding in
3DES must have helped as well.
The concentrated confusion area in Fig. 9 is enlarged in Fig. 10. Firstly we
can see that many applications are being detected as “Spotify Music”, a reason for
this could be the fact that Spotify, being a music player, is designed to work in
the background, thus closing it does not necessarily stop all of it’s processes and it
creates traffic during other applications running time. The reason why Spotify does
not mix with all of the applications is that it was installed simultaneously only with
a certain set of other applications and the applications that produce a lot of traffic
probably overpower Spotify’s background connections.
“Sudoku by Finger Arts” and “Raven” both get detected as multiple different
applications, this happens because both of them do not have much of own traffic.
Yet still they also get right detections, which suggest that these applications have
some kind of network traffic of their own, or that the classifier categorizes some of
the background traffic as these applications.
Additionally “Secret Menu for Starbucks Free”, which has recipes for beverages,
gets often detected as “Great Clips”, which is intended for reserving times at bar-
bershops. Both of these applications are activity oriented and might therefore have
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Figure 8: Sorted and normalized and zoomed confusion matrix plot for phone device
detected by using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
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Figure 9: Sorted and normalized confusion matrix plot for tablet device detected by
using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
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Figure 10: Sorted and normalized and zoomed confusion matrix plot for tablet device
detected by using thresholded probability sums with Eq. 8
some common transmissions of data, although there are no common SDKs between
these two.
7.3 Classifier size
On top of application detection quality, the training and classification speeds must
be addressed as well as disk size required by the classifier as these will grow with the
number of applications. The processing time for data generated on two devices in a
week is parsed ready for machine learning in 18 minutes 30 seconds. The parsing
was done on a Linux PC with Intel Core i7-4700MQ CPU @ 2.40GHz processor
and 16 Gb of RAM. Therefore with straightforward calculation it would be possible
to maintain computation of a constant flow from about 1000 devices without big
modifications to the code.
However 1000 devices is not a high enough number for production environment
cases, as for example it is possible that something breaks in the process, and the
data has to be recalculated. The detection and training speeds are very dependent
on the classifier size on disc, as bigger classifier means more evaluation steps. In
addition to application count, classifier can be given limitations, and it is possible to
reduce the computation required by picking up the right limiting parameters.
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To assess which limits are good and what their effect is on accuracy, following plots
were generated separately for phone and tablet devices, for each of the parameters
described in Sec. 6.5 a set of values was evaluated. The number of trees has been
tested with values between 4 and 28 with steps of 4, depth has been limited with
values between 15 and 50 with steps of 5. Additionally leaf nodes have been limited
with values starting from 250 and steps of 250 until 1500, where step size increases to
500 until 3000 and lastly step size of 1000 until 5000 leaf nodes. For each combination
of values 10 classifiers were trained with consecutive selection of 10% of the data for
testing and the rest for training. In a similar manner as for application detection
calculations, these results of the 10 classifiers are then averaged into one datapoint
representing the set of parameters. The probability sum approach Eq. 7 was used
for detection to keep all applications and flows in the detected set.
Fig. 11a and Fig. 11b visualize effect of the number of trees on the classification
accuracy. Higher number of trees helps avoiding overfitting and allows detection to
be more robust. It is possible to see that in this case the risk of overfitting is not
too high, thus there is no need to get more than 8 or 12 trees to get almost the best
possible results. These figures also show that in case of AES encryption the number
of trees affects the detection quality a bit more, which can be explained by the more
monotonic data padding.
In case other parameters of the classifier are set low, Fig. 11a and Fig. 11b also
show that the detection quality benefits from having more trees. Still having more
than 16 trees does not raise accuracy much.
Maximum tree depth plots can be seen in Fig. 12a and Fig. 12b. These figures
show, that no significant accuracy gain comes from having trees with more than
25 levels. In comparison to the number of trees, the higher depth does not give
better results after a depth of 25 even when looking at the tests where all other
parameters were set to low. Additionally as the mobile phone’s data in Fig. 12b has
fewer applications to be detected, it also gets better accuracy on equal depth limits,
which suggests that the depth requirement will grow with the number of applications.
Another interesting phenomenon can be seen in the lower left part of Fig. 12a,
the accuracy around the 70% is a bit higher for the lowest allowed tree depth than
for other values. This can be due to decision tree algorithm’s overfitting nature or
just a local maxima point which produces good numbers for given datapoints but
would not perform as well on any other dataset.
In Fig. 13a and Fig. 13b it can be seen that the number of leaf nodes affects
the detection accuracy the most. One sign of this is that the variety in classifier’s
accuracy in leaf node plots is much smaller than in the plots by maximum depth
and number of trees. Although this sign can be a bit misleading as for example the
tree depth count could have also been measured for very low values which would
surely reduce the accuracy regardless of other parameters, the accuracy is still getting
better until the tests maximum node limit of 5000 is reached with both AES and
3DES algorithms.
In both cases it is possible to say that limiting leaf nodes to around 4000 yields
results which cannot be made significantly better. One difference between the AES
and 3DES algorithms in this regard is that with 3DES the higher leaf nodes limits
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(a) Tablet device with 3DES
(b) Phone device with AES
Figure 11: Accuracy Eq. 9 calculated with Eq. 7 plotted against number of trees in
Random Forest
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(a) Tablet device with 3DES
(b) Phone device with AES
Figure 12: Accuracy Eq. 9 calculated with Eq. 7 plotted against maximum depth in
Random Forest
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make the results better for any set of other parameters, but in case of AES if other
parameter values are limited, accuracy stops increasing already at around 2000
leaf nodes. This can possibly be explained by the smaller number of detectable
applications or the bigger padding sizes.
Lastly Fig. 14a and Fig. 14b show classification accuracy in comparison to classifier
size. The sizes are calculated by writing the classifier object to disc with help of
a serialization library joblib for Python. As tablet device’s 3DES encryption gives
more variety in packet lengths and has more datapoints and applications, it’s optimal
size is in the ballpark of 120Mb on disc, whereas the phone device’s AES detection
stops getting significantly better at around 80Mb. The exact parameters for these
results are to be found in Table 3.
Table 3: Optimal results and their parameters for both devices.
Device Optimal Accuracy Size Depth limit Leaf Node Limit Trees
Phone 89% 81Mb 40 5000 8
Tablet 96% 116Mb 50 5000 8
The accuracy in Table 3 is naturally not as good as the one calculated with
unlimited parameters in Table 1, because the point was to minimize the classifier size.
Yet considering processing and storing capacity with unlimited parameters for tablet
device the classifier size is 1.2Gb which is 10 times higher than the limited version.
In phone device’s case the unlimited size is 420Mb which is 5 times higher than
the limited classifier of the phone device. Considering that both of the unlimited
classifiers had only 1% better results than the limited versions, it is clear that limiting
makes sense. As a downside limiting might need to be reassessed every time new
data is added, thus making it a bothersome process.
7.4 Number of applications
One problem is that the classifier tends to get very big without limitations, but
in addition to limitations, the number of applications has direct impact on the
detection quality and size. Fig. 15 shows for both devices the average accuracy for
a randomly selected subsets of applications. For each size of subset the number of
random selections to test is calculated for the count of apps to be selected s and
number of all apps a with
θ = ⌊−20 ln(s/a) + 1⌋ (15)
which gets more samples for the smaller counts of apps. It is important to make more
tests on small subsets, because the variation in results is bigger as it depends on
which apps are randomly selected. For each subset 25% of datapoints were evaluated
on a classifier trained on the 75% of the data four times, thus testing against each
datapoint once. In case some applications have small number of datapoints, it can
be that the training or testing parts of the data are empty especially when testing
on 2 applications. In this cases the application set is skipped.
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(a) Tablet device with 3DES
(b) Phone device with AES
Figure 13: Accuracy Eq. 9 calculated with Eq. 7 plotted against maximum leaf nodes
in Random Forest
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(a) Tablet device with 3DES
(b) Phone device with AES
Figure 14: Accuracy Eq. 9 calculated with Eq. 7 plotted against Random Forest
classifier size after dumping with joblib
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Figure 15: Accuracies calculated with Eq. 8 for both devices while training on varying
sized subsets of applications.
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The clearly better results for the tablet device are to be seen here as well, but in
addition to that, the detection quality degradation is smaller for the tablet device,
meaning that application features are better distinguishable. For phone device it’s
possible to see, that with 2 applications the rate of detection seems to be worse than
with 4 applications. This is due to the fact that phone device has several applications
with almost no data, which leads to them making the detection rate worse in cases
where only two applications appear. On the other hand, in case of four applications
it is probable that some of them have non-significant amount of data thus effectively
having fewer detectable applications. This makes the 2 application detection rate
of tablet device somehow comparable to 4 application detection rate of the phone
device.
Overall with tablet device the detection rate is quite stable after selection size
of 8 applications, which might suggest that raising the application count will not
degrade the performance much. This can be seen on the phone device’s data as well,
but it is much less stable because of the applications which did not provide enough
valid launches. The rise of the average accuracy at application size of 80 for the
phone device can be explained by having constant majority of applications with good
amount of training data.
7.5 Features
In addition to parameter tweaking the process can be optimized by dropping useless
features from the data. This will not make the classifier training quicker or size
smaller, but the pre-processing and amount of required data storage can be smaller.
To evaluate which features make actually sense and which not, feature importances
are shown in Fig. 16. In case of tablet device the features are better distinguishable
by the importance, whereas in mobile device’s case the importance distribution
is more monotonic which can be explained by the different padding sizes of the
algorithms. The figure also shows that the device’s outgoing packets are more
important for distinguishing the application, which makes sense as the requests for
data the applications make are expected to be more or less similar, but the content
returned by the server can vary a lot. Autocorrelation of the packet lengths with
small shifts also seem to be very good for application detection as they can show how
many separate things are sent if only looking in one direction or how many direction
switches have happened during the conversation with bigger data sent in case both
directions are considered.
The badness of most of the quantile features can be explained by the fact that
many flows are short or contain multiple smaller packages, thus there is no much
variation in lower sizes of the packets and there are a lot of them. On the other hand,
”out_len_quantile_1.0“ and ”out_len_quantile_0.9“ seem to be very important for
application detection in both devices. As 1400 bytes is the highest packet size seen
in this thesis’ setup and any proper data transfer will have several packets of this
size one would not expect that the maximum packet sizes would matter much. Yet
as the two features in question are based only on the outgoing packages, these values
represent how much data the mobile device actually sends to the server. Especially
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Figure 16: Feature importances of phone device and tablet device classifiers arranged
by tablet devices importances. Classifiers were trained on all existing training data.
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the 0.9 quantile of the outgoing packets represents clearly the possibility of the
flow actually uploading some bigger things to the server. On top of that in case
the application has specific patterns of data it sends e.g. statistics gathering, the
maximum packet lengths may well be less than 1400 bytes and the length of one
datapoint might be fixed as well, allowing to distinguish between various statistics
gathering engines.
To evaluate feature importances further, a test with consecutive removal of the
least important features taken from the original importance list was performed.
Fig. 17 shows a plot of the effect of having fewer features on the detection accuracy.
It can be seen that for both devices the decline in detection accuracy starts at 56
ignored features, thus using only 14 seems sufficient. On the other hand, the top 14
features are different for the two devices, which can be seen from Fig. 16.
The union of both device’s 14 best features is of size 17, with this set of features
tablet device got 97% accuracy and phone deivce 90%, which equal to scores in Ta-
ble 1. The 17 features ordered by name are “in_autocorr_1”, “in_autocorr_2”,
“in_len_quantile_0.8”, “out_autocorr_1”, “out_autocorr_2”, “out_autocorr_3”,
“out_len_avg”, “out_len_kurtosis”, “out_len_mad”, “out_len_quantile_0.8”,
“out_len_quantile_0.9”, “out_len_quantile_1.0”, “out_len_skew”, “out_len_std”,
“out_len_var”, “total_autocorr_1”, “total_len_quantile_0.7”. This set of features
shows that direction of the packets is important as there are almost no ’total’-named
features in this set. On top of that over a third of these features are autocorrelations
which shows the importance packet capture order. The set also highlights that the
outgoing packets are very important for detection as over 2/3 of the features are
focused on them.
A check on the classifier sizes during feature removal showed that the size of the
classifier on disc is relatively stable until the number of features becomes very small.
When there are fewer than 10 features on phone device, the size of the classifier
becomes unpredictable and can go from very low to very high. However the detection
quality in this cases drops significantly and the setup does not become more optimal.
Thus there is not much sense studying having very few features further.
7.6 Unknown applications
In reality it is very difficult to gather proper ground truth of all applications available
on the market. Thus to be sure about classifier’s results, the effect of unknown
applications must be studied. Evaluation of this effect on the detection quality
was done by excluding applications from the training part and appending all of
the available launches of excluded applications in the test dataset. Table 4 shows
accuracy results for test where 25% of the data has been selected as testing data four
times to cover all the datapoints as testing points together with the excluded data.
For each number of excluded applications four random exclusions were made and
their values averaged over. Only the thresholded probability sums algorithm Eq. 8 is
able to ignore the unknown applications and is thus used here. Other two algorithms
will forcefully give a result from the training set of applications.
The ratio rows in Table 4 are calculated for count of excluded applications e and
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Figure 17: Classifier performance with subsets of features where least important
ones have been gradually removed. 25% of the data is four times detected on a
classifier trained on 75% of the data for full datapoint coverage. The detection quality
evaluated with probability sums Eq. 7.
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number of all applications a with equation
υ =
a− e
4
a− e
4 + e
(16)
and approximates the relation between the trained and the untrained test data. In
case every application had the same number of launches in the dataset and detection
were perfect, this value would show the fraction of test data that should be detected.
The division by 4 in Eq. 16 comes from the fact that a quarter of the data is used
for testing purposes. Similarity of ratio values with actual accuracy suggests that
the detection is not able to filter the unknown applications well enough.
The results in the Table 4 show that naturally when more unknown application
launches are in the dataset for detection, the prediction quality drops. This happens
mostly because the more unknown application launches are in the testing dataset,
the bigger the testing dataset is all in all and if the unknonwn applications are
not filtered out by the threshold, the result will be worse. On top of that some
applications might have common typed flows, which would be considered uncertain
by the classifier if both applications were present in the testing dataset. Thus when
only one of the applications sharing same typed flows is in the training set all other
applications with that flow type would be detected as the one in the training set.
Threshold values in the Table 4 clearly show that filtering out the uncertain
flows has a great effect on the accuracy of detection. Compared to the τ = 0.4 the
τ = 0.9 results are noticeably higher, especially with 64 excluded applications, where
the ratio is almost doubling in favor for τ = 0.9. On the downside with this high
threshold values there is a possibility for right predictions to be missed as well.
Table 4: Detection accuracy with randomly excluding applications from training by
excluded application count. Detection was performed with thresholded probability
sums Eq. 8.
Excluded count Threshold τ 2 4 16 64
Phone ratio υ - 94% 89% 63% 20%
Phone accuracy 0.4 88% 89% 63% 20%
Phone accuracy 0.7 90% 89% 73% 31%
Phone accuracy 0.9 97% 97% 76% 38%
Tablet ratio υ - 96% 92% 72% 32%
Tablet accuracy 0.4 95% 89% 71% 34%
Tablet accuracy 0.7 97% 94% 82% 43%
Tablet accuracy 0.9 99% 97% 87% 57%
7.7 Cross-device
Although having training data from all devices and OSes is more feasible than from
all applications on market, it still requires a huge static workload. Next test assesses
54
how well the detection works when trained on one device and evaluated against
another device. There were 113 applications in common between the test devices,
only these applications were selected for this test, as it was not intended to detect
unknown applications.
The thresholded detection algorithm was selected to minimize the error rate,
as different encryption algorithms with different padding should produce different
results. Results are in Table 5 and look very good, but it must noted that while
detecting phone launches only 75% of launches passed the threshold filtering and for
the the tablet device only 73%. Because only three quarters of application launches
pass the threshold limit, it is clear that a lot of data will be lost to uncertainty, which
suggest that there should be a training set for each device or at least each type of
padding for encryption. On the other hand this result is much better than expected,
considering the differences of the encryption algorithms for these two devices.
Table 5: Cross-device test was performed with default parameters for classifier. All
available data was used for training and testing. Metrics are calculated for thresholded
probability sums Eq. 8.
Train on Evaluate on Accuracy α Precision ϕ Recall ρ F1 Score f1
Phone Tablet 77% 63% 59% 56%
Tablet Phone 74% 63% 61% 57%
7.8 Bad connection
In addition to difficulties of keeping up with all devices and applications, there is
a high chance of bad network connectivity, which affects the detection quality. For
testing robustness against bad network conditions the mobile device connection path
was changed according to Fig. 18. The controller PC creates a WIFI access point
to which the mobile devices connect and routes the traffic with Network Address
Translation (NAT) readdressing into network access point’s WIFI connection. The
readdressing allows the PC to reserve only one IP address from the network access
point’s IP range, which is easier than bridging the mobile devices through with their
own IPs. Special filtering rules are applied to the connection marked by red arrow
in such a way, that only the connection between mobile devices and VPN Server is
worsened, thus leaving the control channels, where the commands are sent to mobile
devices and VPN server, intact. This is implemented in Linux with traffic control
program ”tc qdisc“ [59] and iptables routing infrastructure.
The configuration for the ”bad“ link is trying to mimic a very unstable connection
with following parameters. Varying delay of 100ms± 50ms is added to the link with
25% correlation between values. Packet reordering is done in the following manner:
80% of packets are sent in original order with 40% of correlation. Additionally 1%
of packets are duplicated and 1% are corrupted, both with 40% correlation. On
top of that a loss model is applied with two states, random loss and burst loss,
where the possibility of moving from random to burst is 1% and the other way 30%.
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Figure 18: Connection topology for testing bad quality network connection. The red
link is synthetically made bad.
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During random state the loss is 0.5% and during the burst state the loss is 70%. The
correlation in ”tc qdisc“ is stated by Beuran to mimic statistical correlation [60].
With these link parameters the devices were left running for 24 hours. Because
of bad connectivity many of the application launches had no valid flows and were not
counted into the statistics. The total launch count was 1953 based on launcher logs,
for 21 applications on phone device and 26 applications on tablet device. The classifier
detected 24 different applications for phone device and 76 different applications for
the tablet device.
Classifiers were trained on all existing automatically generated launches for both
devices respectively. Table 6 shows the detection metrics, which are not too good.
Overall the phone device had a lot launches that did not produce any valid flows and
the tablet device’s launches were not detected too well. It must be noted, that some
of the phone device’s launches did not happen in reality, because the control of phone
device was not perfect and the phone device’s VPN enforcement did not seem to
work well enough either. However mostly this is due to the fact that the conditions
for data transfer were awful. In reality the base stations for mobile network might
request data re-transmission as well as fix corrupted and out of order packets before
sending them further into the internet therefore making the packets received by VPN
server cleaner. As the accuracy is much higher than the other metrics in Table 6,
one can say that in tablet device’s case there are only a few applications that are
detected well and they dominate count-wise.
Table 6: Table of scores with 1953 application launches over bad connection. The
default parameters for classifier were used with 10 decision trees and unlimited depth
and leaf nodes. Metrics are calculated with thresholded probability sums Eq. 8.
Device Detected count ι Accuracy α Precision ϕ Recall ρ F1 Score f1
Phone 85 91% 82% 77% 77%
Tablet 1398 83% 31% 27% 28%
7.9 Real usage
The last test was done against real usage of the devices without any scripting to
evaluate how feasible this approach is in reality. Gathering of the test data this way
requires a lot of time, thus the testing datasets are not very big. Table 7 contains the
results for real usage and only launches by hand on the tablet device as well as with
device where the OS is newer to evaluate how the change in the operating system
and applications affects the detection quality. Classifiers were trained on all existing
automatically generated launches for the tablet device, because of new OS device
shared the encryption method with tablet device. Because of the same algorithms,
encryption should have no effect on results and the manual usage together with newer
OS should be the main problems for detection.
The Table 7 clearly shows that there is a huge degradation in detection quality
with newer OS compared to the OS which was used in training. Degradation is also
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a lot higher than in the cross-device test in Sec. 7.7. Noticeably higher difference in
the OS version combined with much newer application versions must be one of the
reasons for this. Higher threshold values also make the detection more secure but on
the downside the count of applications being reported drops.
In newer OS the detection with lower threshold values has better results in the
test where the device was properly used, which might suggest that although the
train data has been generated by only launching applications, the detection benefits
from flows that are generated during proper usage as well. On the other hand, in
case of higher threshold values the detection in the no use case becomes a bit better,
thus showing that there still are some flows generated by actual usage disturbing the
detection process by having classifier detect them wrongly with high probabilities.
But the F1 score values f1 are worse than with actual usage in the high threshold
scenario, which means that smaller part of the applications is actually detected well.
This shows that actual usage does not disturb the application detection as much if a
threshold is applied to ignore the user generated flows.
The detected count also drops a lot quicker with the newer device at higher
threshold values, showing that the classifier’s uncertainty works well. Unfortunately
it still is not enough as the accuracy for the new device is very bad, which shows
that it is not enough to have same encryption while training ground truth data.
Similarly in the tablet device’s case the scores are a bit better when the device
is in actual use and the drop of the detected application count with the increase of
the threshold is also smaller. A strange thing is that in tablet device’s case all of
the metrics are better for the no use case, except the F1 Score. This might happen
because the tested launch number is more than twice higher for the no use case than
for the proper usage case, thus there is a possibility that applications which are not
detected so well play a bigger role in the no use case.
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Table 7: Table of scores with manual usage. The default parameters for classifier were
used with 10 decision trees and unlimited depth and leaf nodes. Metrics are calculated
with thresholded probability sums Eq. 8. Note that threshold τ = 0 is effectively the
same as maximum probability with Eq. 7. ”use“ means that applications were used
normally without killing and ”no use“ means that applications were only launched
and then killed from task manager. The ”Newer OS“-device uses same encryption
algorithm as tablet device and tablet device’s classifier trained over all of the 184
apps was used.
Device Threshold τ Detected count ι Accuracy α F1 Score f1
Tablet use 0 22 77% 69%
Tablet use 0.4 21 81% 71%
Tablet use 0.7 18 94% 92%
Tablet no use 0 45 78% 69%
Tablet no use 0.4 39 87% 81%
Tablet no use 0.7 33 94% 89%
Newer OS use 0 42 40% 25%
Newer OS use 0.4 38 45% 26%
Newer OS use 0.7 25 52% 30%
Newer OS no use 0 74 26% 15%
Newer OS no use 0.4 53 34% 19%
Newer OS no use 0.7 29 59% 28%
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8 Discussion
With the results provided by Sec. 7 it is possible to understand the system better.
This sections provides thoughts about the current system together with comparisons
to some of the previous works and ideas for improvement.
First of all as the delta degrees are used in case of working on a sample and in this
thesis’ context the packet length data is full, the usage of delta degrees one in Sec. 6.3
does not actually make much sense. A study on the effect of setting delta degrees
to zero should be performed, as the features it is used with could become more
meaningful for flow categorization. The sole reason for using the delta degrees one is
that it was a default option in the pandas library and during the implementation
phase the library’s operation was not studied thoroughly. Next the weak points and
weird facts shall be brought forward.
8.1 Application start time
During the analysis in Sec. 7 it was noticed that setting a 20 second hard limit on
the application start time in training data actually made the detection results worse.
This means that the applications should have run longer than that and that the flows
which end later than the 20 second mark after start of the application are important
for detection. Yet still the method of just launching the applications proved to give
satisfactory results. Additionally during manual detection phase the limitation on
the flow length from the application start was mostly worsening the results as well,
but in this case it was not so clear. This happens possibly because the flows recorded
during scripted starts of the applications do not always happen at the start and
additionally there could be useful flows during the application closing event.
On top of that, as the applications are very different, their starting times can
vary between 1 second and 20 seconds and for some games the times can be even
longer. Thus it could be possible to study every application more thoroughly to
know how long does the usual start last, this could then be implemented as a varying
start time for the ground truth generation and could potentially make the results
more stable. There is also a possibility that some applications have constant flows
that are running throughout the application’s open-time, thus if the hard limit is set
and the application closes a bit later, this flow gets discarded.
8.2 Preprocessing and parsing network traffic
In real use when the application is changed, it is not necessarily closed and might
still for example start sending some of it’s statistics reports in the background. This
might interfere with the next application’s detection especially if only the application
starting traffic is used, therefore making the selection of the previously discussed
application start time even more difficult. The results in Sec. 7.9 did not give any
definitive answers to this problem, as the tests where applications were manually
killed before launching next one did not perform much better.
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One option to make the detection better is to try to somehow separate the flows
that are generated by the OS’s background processes and possibly flows that are
common for several applications. Removing these flows could be done beforehand or
they could be used as a separate class that would not affect the resulting predictions.
This is currently implemented in the way of setting a threshold on classifier’s certainty
values, but if there was a way to easily separate these flows, it could potentially make
the detection better. Especially in cases with unknown applications this could help
a lot, as these flows would not point to wrong places.
Naturally during real usage, there will also be a lot of user generated flows
which the classifier has not seen during the training phase. There is no clear way
of separating these flows except for using the thresholded method similarly to the
previous paragraph. This is one of the reasons start time limitation had been tried
in this thesis, but it did not perform well enough.
Additionally the flows were not filtered by their length in any way in this thesis.
In fact many flows might consist of only a couple of packets, making most of the
proposed features meaningless. For example in work [48] Taylor et al. proposed to
set a minimum limit to flow length, thus cleaning up the data which goes to machine
learning. This might or might not make the detection methods used in this thesis
better, because some features are also meaningful for short flows and could help the
detection.
8.3 Machine learning
To utilize the gathered network traffic better this thesis used the actual timestamps
of when the application was running, which in comparison to other works with similar
goals helps a lot. This approach allowed concatenation of all of the flows generated
by a singular application run, which improves the application detection noticeably.
Just assigning flows to applications had accuracy of about 70%, but in the best case
with concatenation results of 97% were achieved. Usage of Random Forest algorithm
proved to be a good idea but it still could make sense to study other approaches of
flow classification.
It was strange to see the classifier perform so well with the default value of 10 trees
and parametrization checks revealed that even 8 trees is enough. For example in [61]
Oshiro et al. showed that the optimal number of trees should be in the ballpark
of 64. This suggests that the cross device results and especially the results for the
newest OS could maybe be better if there were more trees in the forest. Still a quick
test with Random Forest of 64 trees was done on the data for the device with newer
OS with threshold τ = 0.4, the results were almost the same, only the F1 score in
use case got a bit better. Thus it does not make sense to create bigger forests, as the
disc space and processing requirements become much bigger while the results are
almost the same. One of the reasons for not needing more trees could be the fact
that the per app data point count is high, which allows training each tree better.
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8.4 Feature selection aspects
As noted in Sec. 8.2 there are some cases, where features of a certain datapoint are
meaningless. This thesis did consider optimization of the process by cleaning up the
used features and by limiting the classifier training. In Sec. 7.3 it was shown that in
both cases a lot can be done, but no real tests with massive numbers of devices have
been performed. In reality some of the optimizations might require constant tuning
when new applications and OS versions emerge, which could become infeasible.
On the other hand as most of the traffic is transferred over TCP it could be
possible to construct other features based on packet flags. TCP implements various
prioritization techniques which might help detection quite a lot. For example when
doing real time data exchanges like voice calls the packets might get higher priority
to shorten latency between the participants of the call. Overall having this kind of
information would require a more thorough study of the VPN encapsulation solutions
to know if this kind of data is actually seen outside the VPN tunnel or change the
capture point to see the un-encrypted data.
Additionally packet inter-arrival times could provide a lot of information about
the trasmission, but they are much more difficult to parse, because of varying
network conditions. Potentially some rules could be made which study the whole
connection and scale the inter-arrival times according to the connection length and
type. Unfortunately this was considered currently infeasible and was left out of scope
of this thesis.
The approach in this thesis heavily relies on having the possibilities of traffic’s
separation into flows. In case all of the traffic had been sent in a singular flow
these approaches would not have worked. Additionally as a method of detection’s
mitigation, random length data could be added to each packet by the VPN system
to obfuscate the packet lengths during the transmission, which would also break
the system. A singular flow VPN could also be used to block this approach, but it
would probably still allow some kind of information extraction from the traffic. And
the addition of random data would increase traffic amount which is not wanted by
network connection providers and could become noticeably more expensive for the
users as well as slow down user’s the data transfers.
8.5 Robustness
To process all the capture data in a feasible time, parallelization is used with
assumption that every application launch is in a separate capture file which might
not be easily achieved in a real environment. On top of that the processing speed
calculations do not account for the phone device’s unstability. On the other hand, it
could be possible to optimize the system by running Bro Network Security Monitor
on the VPN server and even directly extract the features with it. This would help
a lot since using tshark for faulty flow detection is slowing the process down and
feature extraction with pandas is probably not the most optimal solution either.
On top of processing feasibility there are problems with training dataset generation,
as shown in the Sec. 7.9, the performance of new device was far from perfect, which
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creates requirements for new training data. With the constantly updated applications
and OSes it is not easy to define when new training data is actually needed. Therefore
a process would be needed, which constantly generates some amount of ground truth
data for re-evaluation of the current classifier and then decides how much ground
truth has to be generated for each application. Even if the checks and the application
selections could be made automatically, the process, in it’s current state, will still
require some manual work to keep the devices running. This amount of manual work
might make the solution unsuitable for production use-cases.
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9 Conclusion
This thesis discussed utilization of information gathered around mobile devices
showing that it is very rich and there are use cases ranging from preventing spread
of diseases to getting very fine grained information about the device owners. As the
aim of the thesis is inferring a mobile application in use by network traffic, several
approaches to similar problems were discussed and the most suitable one was chosen
as base.
This application detection approach was then tweaked, implemented and tested
thoroughly on a 50 day ground truth dataset with labeled application launches
together with their relevant network traffic from two devices. Overall the results
showed that while the presented detection system is heavy and might not handle
high loads, with introduced tweaks the system should be light enough to bring it
into production environment and run reliably. Additionally the limiting factors were
brought up giving idea of what could be done differently. However the tweaking
will require a lot of work and the ground truth generation process requires more
automation to be feasible for usage in modern environment, where software updates
are rolling in on a weekly basis.
The results are well comparable with ones presented in Sec. 3 and the amount
of different analyses has allowed better understanding of the system’s performance
limitations. The best achieved results were the thresholded results for tablet device
shown in Sec. 7.1: 98% accuracy, 99% precision 98% recall and 97% F1 Score while
still including 99% of the available launches from ground truth related to the device.
This nearly perfect score shows the huge potential the presented approach has at
providing reliable application detection. Additionally Sec. 7.3, Sec. 7.4 and Sec. 7.5
show that the system is not very heavy and there is room to optimize it even further
without loosing much in classification quality. The cross device Sec. 7.7 and bad
connection Sec. 7.8 tests gave also more or less satisfactory results, showing that the
system can adapt to some extent to different devices and connection qualities.
Unfortunately the manual test Sec. 7.9 showed that although the system works
more or less well on the trained device even in cases where users are utilizing the
applications for real, the system is not applicable in current state to the newest
versions of applications. With worst results being accuracy 26% and F1 score of 15%.
Even with high thresholding the accuracy reached only 59% and F1 score only 28%,
which is far from enough to call it reliable. On the other hand, the manual tests
were very short and possibly a higher variety in applications could provide results
with better insight. Additionally the time difference in OS and app versions was in
ballpark of several years, meaning that probably if the training set consisted from
newer applications, it could have much better results.
Overall the work was performed according to Sec. 4. Although at this stage
still a lot of optimization work is required to be able to use the system in produc-
tion, the thesis has proved that there is sense in studying these possibilities further.
Additionally a more thorough study on application version differences would allow
understanding the re-teaching requirements better. Which together with higher vari-
ety in OS versions would enable proper speculation of production grade deployability,
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as it is at current stage impossible.
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